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RESPONSE TO ELAINE JENKINS5 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the alleged Statement of Facts in the Brief of Elaine Jenkins may 
represent the testimony of Ms. Jenkins, they are really not relevant to the issues on 
appeal. However, Alan Jenkins believes that certain of the "facts" set forth in Ms. 
Jenkins' Brief, misrepresent the evidence and should be addressed. 
Brief of Appellee, p. 1: 1. Elaine Jenkins was raised in an economic system under 
which all "income" and "property" of the members were held "in common" (the 
"Order") 
Ms. Jenkins herself testified that the property and units "she owned" was her 
own, to spend or use as she pleased, and was recognized as her own by the 
cooperative. (Brief of Appellee, p. 2, paragraphs 4-5; brief of Appellee, p. 6, 
paragraph 28). The other members of the Davis County Co-operative, and even 
the ex-members, testified that the property listed on their inventories was property 
owned by the member, not the co-operative. (R. at 385, p. 165, 171, 177, 189, 376; 
386, pp 430-431). There was no evidence that any property was held "in common" 
by the members of the co-operative, or by the co-operative itself. 
Brief of Appellee, p. 4: 18. When members of the Order purchased a home, they 
were "expected to turn the title [to Home] over to [the Order] and allow [the 
Order] to put title in the name of one of their entities. 
Contrary to the testimony of some ex-members of the cooperative called by 
Elaine Jenkins, none of whom produced any documentation evidencing how title to 
the real property was held, each of the witnesses called by Alan Jenkins testified 
that their homes were titled in their own names, some going clear back to 1963. 
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They produced the recorded documents to prove that the homes were titled in the 
names of the owners^ not in the name of the cooperative, or an entity affiliated with 
the cooperative. These witnesses were not selected because their homes were in 
their names. They were the individuals who dealt with Elaine Jenkins, D. U. Co., 
Davis County Co-operative, were familiar with the issues in the case and 
represented typical cooperative members. 
Verl Johnson, president of D. U. Company, testified (R. at 385, pp. 218-219), 
Q. By Mr. Kingston: I show you what has been marked as Defendant's 
Exhibit 13. Can you identify that document? 
A. It's the deed to my home. 
Q. And it lists you as the owner? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. And it does have the recording information in the top right-hand corner; 
does it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that property ever in the name of DU Company? 
A. No. 
Q. Anybody else's name other than the entity that you acquired it from? 
A. No. 
Q. The entity that is listed as the grantor when you purchased the property 
Was Earning Services Corporation. 
A. Yes. 
Q. To your knowledge, does anyone in that company have any connection at 
all with Davis County Cooperative? 
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A. No. 
Q. Are the officers or directors of that company members of the 
cooperative? 
A. No. 
Alan Jenkins, the appellant, testified (R. at 385, pp. 254-255), 
Q. Okay, I'm going to show you what has been marked as Defendant's 
Exhibit D-20. Can you identify that document? 
A. Yes, I can. 
Q. What is it? 
A. This is a deed to my house. 
Q. Whose name is that house in? 
A. Alan Jenkins, 6227 South 300 East, Murray, Utah. 
Q. Has it always been in your name since that date? 
A. It has. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you you had to put that into somebody else's name 
or some company's name? 
A. Never. 
Q. Have you ever understood it to be a tenant {sic, should be "tenet") or a 
belief or an obligation that a member of the cooperative to put their property 
into somebody else's name? 
A. No. 
Alanna {sic, should be "Ilona") Kingston, the secretary of the Davis County 
Cooperative, testified (R. at 385, pp. 344-345), 
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Q. Have you ever heard of a tenant (sic, should be "tenet") or a teaching of 
the cooperative that says if a member buys real property, it can't be put into 
their own name? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you own any real property? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What property do you own? 
A. Are you talking about real property? 
Q. Real property. 
A. My home at 1798 South 9th East. 
Q. Who is the record owner of that home? 
A. lam. 
Q. How long have you owned that? 
A. Well, I've actually owned it since '63, but I think we registered it in the 
'80's. 
Q. Why did you wait so long to register it? 
A. I just didn't realize that it had to be registered. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 34. 
Can you identify that document? 
A. Yes, it's a deed. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It's a deed for my home. 
Q. And does it show you as the owner of the home? 
A. Yes, it does. 
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Q. It shows I. G. Kingston; is that you? 
A. That's me, uh-huh. 
Q. Who owned the home before you did? 
A. My grandmother. 
Q. Was she a member of the Davis County Cooperative Society? 
A. Yes, she was. 
Q. Was the property in her name before she deeded it to you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was she a good member? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you a good member? 
A. I hope so. 
Q. Did anybody ever tell you you had to put that property into somebody 
else's name? 
A. No. 
Q. So that's been done clear since 1963? 
A. Right. 
Elaine Crossley, the former secretary of D. U. Company, testified (R. at 386, 
pp. 415-416), 
Q. Do you own your own home? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. I show you what's been marked as Defendant's 42. Can you tell me 
what that document is? 
A. It's the warranty deed that MSE granted to myself. 
Q. It says to B. E. Crossley. Is that you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does "B" stand for? 
A. Bonnie. 
Q. And"E"? 
A. Elaine. 
Q. So that is the deed to your property. Is that where you live? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that as a member of the cooperative, that 
property should be placed in somebody else's name or some business' 
name? 
A. No. 
Francis Mark Hansen, the attorney that represented Elaine Jenkins' ex-
husband, Sam Jenkins, in their divorce action, testified (R. at 386, pp. 428-430), 
Q. Do you own the home where you live? 
A. I do. 
Q. Whose name is that home in? 
A. It's in the name of myself and my wife. 
Q. I show you Defendant's Exhibit 45. Can you identify that document, 
please? 
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A. Yes, that is the Warranty Deed to my home. I copied it this morning 
from the original. 
Q. By Mr. Cline {sic, should be "Kingston"): And what's the date of that 
document? 
A. It is November 17 , 1989, the date we purchased the home. We actually 
moved in on December 1st of that year. 
Q. Has it always been in your name since that date? 
A. It has always been in the name of - in fact, there has been no change to 
the warranty deed. 
Q. And it said it's in the name of F. Mark Hansen and Suzanne Hansen as 
well? 
A. As tenants in the entirety, yes. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that as a member of the cooperative, it was 
required that you put that property in somebody else's name, or some other 
business' name? 
A. No, and in fact, when we first purchased the property, the lender was 
Fidelity Funding Company. That's a company that was managed by Rachel 
Young, who was also a member of Davis County Cooperative Society, and 
they made the loan with full knowledge of the way this warranty deed was 
prepared. 
Q. Didn't have any problem with that? 
A. No problem at all. 
Brief of Appellee, p. 4: Each year, the Davis County Cooperative Society gave 
each member of the Order an ^inventory" that listed all property owned by the 
member. 
Although "inventories" were typed by the cooperative and given to the 
members, each person who testified regarding the preparation of the inventories, 
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including Elaine Jenkins, testified that the list of property on a member's inventory 
sheet, and the value placed on the property, was prepared by the member, not by the 
cooperative. 
Elaine Jenkins testified that she and/or Sam, her ex-husband provided the 
information for the inventories, including the property listed and its value (R. at 
384, p. 95). Ms. Jenkins' own witnesses verified that each member would provide 
the list of property and the values that would be on their inventories. Mr. Peterson 
testified (R. at 385, p. 181), 
Q. . . .do you know who submits that information, [on the inventories].. .? 
A. The different people. They can fill out the papers that they - before the 
end of the year; and then they submit them to Alana or different people. 
Then they take and they put them on paper, and then they give them to you 
in January. 
Q. Okay. So the information that would be on the top of the exhibit that 
you've looked at, it's your understanding that that information was provided 
by Sam and Elaine Jenkins? 
A. Yeah. 
Ilona Kingston, the secretary of Davis County Cooperative Society, testified 
that each member prepares his or her own inventory and lists what property he or 
she believes should be listed, along with a value they want to put on the property. 
The cooperative doesn't care what the member lists, what value is placed on the 
property and never checks the list for accuracy or errors. (R. at 385, pp. 356-357). 
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Francis Mark Hansen testified that a member can put anything on his inventory that 
he wants to and put any valuation on his property that he wants, and no one ever 
questions it. (R. at 386, p. 431) 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE DENIAL OF ALAN JENKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE. 
Elaine Jenkins cites the case of Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment, Inc. 
174 P3d 1 (Utah App. 2007) in support of her argument that the denial of Alan 
Jenkins' motion for summary judgment is not appealable. However, the court in 
Normandeau said at §13 
Utah case law suggests that we will entertain an appeal of a denial of a 
motion for summary judgment only if it involves a legal issue. In Estate 
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed a denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits because 
the trial court "was dealing with undisputed facts, [and its] denial of 
summary judgment amounted to a ruling of law." 
Alan Jenkins' motion for summary judgment was based upon two legal 
theories, to wit, the statute of frauds and judicial estoppal. The facts supporting Mr. 
Jenkins' motion, as set forth in the motion and in Appellant's Brief, were not 
disputed at the trial level and they are not disputed in Elaine Jenkins' Brief of 
Appellee. The trial court's denial of the motion was clearly a ruling of law, subject 
to review by this Court. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A, Elaine Jenkins5 Claims are Barred by the Statute of Frauds, 
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Elaine Jenkins argues that the trial court correctly denied Alan Jenkins's 
motion, because her affidavit alleging that she and Sam Jenkins purchased the 
property and that D. U. Company held the property for the benefit of her and Sam, 
created an issue of fact, whether or not there was an oral agreement that was 
disputed. 
As discussed in Alan Jenkins' Appellant's brief, Elaine Jenkins' affidavit 
did not meet the criteria needed in order to take the issue out of the statute of 
frauds. She did not show that there was any agreement, written or oral, with 
anyone, that she was the owner of the home, or that D. U. Company, or anyone else 
agreed that it was hers, or if there were an agreement, what the agreement required 
her to do in order to acquire title to the home. The case of Ravarino v. Price, 123 
Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953), ruled that a statement made by the claimant to 
property, of full or partial performance, is not sufficient to create an exception to 
the statute of frauds, unless the claimant's actions "establish by clear and positive 
proof, acts and things done in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively 
referable thereto". Ms. Jenkins' acts demonstrated nothing more than that she was 
a tenant of the property. 
B. Elaine Jenkins' Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Judicial 
Estoppal. 
Even if the court were to find that there was a disputed issue of fact as to the 
statute of frauds argument, there was no disputed issue of fact regarding Alan 
Jenkins' judicial estoppal argument. In the previous divorce action, Elaine Jenkins 
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and her ex-husband Sam, both represented to the court, to their attorneys, to each 
other and to everyone else who may have relied upon those representations, that 
they neither owned nor had acquired any interest in the real property at issue in this 
case. Elaine Jenkins argues that she didn't really mean what she said and that her 
attorney in the previous legal action misled her and told her that even though she 
said she had no interest in the subject property, she could change her story later and 
claim ownership in a subsequent legal action. Even if that were true, her subjective 
intent is not material. Under the controlling case law, what she did and what she 
agreed to are what matters. In Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neweys, Inc., 16 P.3d 
1214, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2000 UT 93, Macris argued that he didn't really 
intend that by signing a stipulation settling his claims against Neweys, he would be 
barred from raising claims that arose out of the transaction after the date of the 
stipulation. The Court in Macris said, 
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions 
which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is applicable to all 
matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. . . It 
follows, therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or design withhold 
issues and litigate them in separate actions. 
If the law is, as stated in Macris, that one cannot withhold an issue that 
should have been litigated in a previous action, and then litigate it in a subsequent 
action, it certainly follows that if the very issue is litigated and ruled upon in a 
previous action, that issue cannot be relitigated in a subsequent action. The 
ownership of real property was at issue in Ms. Jenkins' previous divorce action, it 
was litigated in that action and it was ruled upon. Ms. Jenkins, in the previous 
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action, said she did not own the property at issue in this case and she cannot in this 
subsequent action, relitigate that very same issue. 
Elaine Jenkins argues that judicial estoppal does not apply in this case, 
because there is "no identity of issues" and the issue of ownership was "not 
competently, fully and fairly litigated". Again, Macris is determinative on these 
issues. 
(i) The issue is the same. The issue in the prior litigation was, what real 
property did Elaine and Sam Jenkins own or have an interest in. The issue in the 
present litigation, is whether or not Elaine Jenkins owns or has an interest in the 
real property at 1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, Utah. Elaine 
Jenkins argues that since she now claims that D. U. Company held the subject 
property in trust for her, the issue of whether or not she had an interest in the 
property is not the same as whether or not she and Sam owned or had an interest in 
the property at the time of their divorce. Whether property is owned in fee title, or 
as a beneficiary of some kind of trust, it is still an "interest" in the property. In the 
present case, Elaine Jenkins testified throughout the trial that she owned the 
property from the time D. U. Company purchased it from Mr. Berg. That is directly 
contrary to what she said and did in the prior divorce action. In the prior litigation, 
both Elaine Jenkins and Sam Jenkins declared that they had "acquired no other real 
property during the course of the marriage", except for the real property in Rupert, 
Idaho. Even if there could be a distinction between fee ownership and owning a 
beneficial interest in some kind of trust arrangement, whether or not Sam and 
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Elaine had an interest in the real property at 1074 North Redwood Road, was 
certainly a "matter essentially connected with the litigation" in the divorce action, 
as described in Macris. 
Elaine Jenkins argues that to hold that she is now barred from asserting a 
claim to the real property, because she failed to list the property in the divorce 
action, would lead to the absurd result that where parties to a divorce proceeding 
fail to list all of the real property that they own, that would cause their ownership 
interest in the property to disappear, and a third party would reap a windfall. That 
simply is not so. The ownership of, or interests in real property, is governed by 
statute. Such interests, with strict exceptions, must be evidenced by documents 
properly recorded in the county where the property is located. If the record title 
evidences an interest of a person involved in a divorce proceeding, the failure to list 
the property will not change the record, or result in an extinguishment of the 
interest. However, because there are laws that govern real property ownership, 
transfers, liens and other interests therein, a party claiming an interest in or to real 
property is bound by those laws. An oversight in not listing certain real or personal 
property in a divorce action, is far different from what we have in this case. It was 
not a case of simply not listing the property, it was a case where Ms. Jenkins and 
her ex husband both declared that they did not own any real property, except for 
that in Idaho. It was not something she overlooked, or forgot about. She was living 
in the subject property at the time of the divorce with her children. She even admits 
that she discussed her interest in the property that she now claims she has owned 
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since 1986 with her divorce attorney before she signed the Stipulation in 1997 that 
said she had no interest in it. 
(ii) The issue was competently, fully and fairly litigated. Elaine Jenkins 
argues that the issue of ownership of the subject property was not fully and fairly 
litigated, because the stipulation she signed did not manifest an intent that she be 
bound by the stipulation in a subsequent action. However, it could not have been 
made more clear, that her intent in signing the stipulation was to declare that she 
owned no interest in any real property, other than the property in Rupert, Idaho. It 
would be contrary to law and to the holding in Macris, to rule that a statement in a 
stipulation filed with a court will only be binding on the party signing the 
stipulation in future litigation, if that party includes a phrase in the stipulation that 
she intends the statement to also be binding upon her in subsequent litigation. As 
the Court in Macris said, 
. . .if the stipulation is meant to be final as to some damages but not final as 
to other damages, it must say so. Our review of the record in this case, 
however, evidences no such intention. Moreover, the trial court made no 
finding that its damages award - which was based upon the stipulation - was 
not final as to all damages. Therefore, we find that the stipulation in this 
case has res judicata effect. 
As in the Macris case, there was nothing in the stipulation, findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, or decree of divorce in the Jenkins divorce that indicated any 
intent on the part of the trial court to limit the ruling that neither Sam nor Elaine 
Jenkins owned any real property except for that in Rupert, Idaho. Where a 
statement of fact in a stipulation is as simple as "she does or she doesn't" own real 
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property, that alone is sufficient evidence that the party intends to be bound by the 
stipulation and that the issue is foreclosed in other litigation. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' MOTION 
TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE. 
The trial court ostensibly gave three reasons for denying the motion of Alan 
Jenkins to amend his answer to include an additional defense of the statute of 
limitations: (1) The Motion was not timely; (2) No good reason was given why the 
Motion was untimely; and (3) The plaintiff would be prejudiced. However, the 
record does not support any of the reasons given. The validity of the proposed 
affirmative defense depended upon the date Elaine Jenkins' cause of action arose 
and when she knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of 
action. Alan Jenkins' Motion to Amend was filed more than ninety days prior to 
the date set for trial. Ninety days was ample time for Elaine Jenkins to prepare to 
meet the defense, particularly where no additional discovery would be needed. The 
case law regarding when an answer may be amended, is particularly liberal, when 
the proposed amendment raises an affirmative defense. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 
2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm. 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 
1976). The motion, filed ninety days before trial, was timely. 
The primary reason given by Alan Jenkins for the motion, as acknowledged 
by the trial judge, was newly discovered evidence, learned by Alan Jenkins during 
discovery in preparation for trial, through the interview of witnesses familiar with 
the events. The trial judge acknowledged this reason when he commented at the 
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hearing, "Apparently you have become aware of this as a result of information that 
has come to your attention". There was no claim that Alan Jenkins knew or should 
have known of the facts raising the issue of the statute of limitations being a viable 
defense before he learned of those facts through trial preparation. A justifiable 
reason was given for the delay in raising the additional defense. Rule 15 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave to amend should be freely given 
when justice so requires. To deny Alan Jenkins the affirmative defense of the 
statute of limitations, codified in §§78-12-25 and 78-12-26, effectively denied him 
justice in this case. 
Although the trial court declared that the plaintiff would be prejudiced 
because she may have to undertake additional discovery to prepare to meet the 
additional defense, there was no suggestion, either by the Court or by Elaine 
Jenkins, identifying the nature of any additional discovery that would be required. 
It is clear that no additional discovery would have been required. The timing of the 
events were well settled, the facts of events regarding Elaine Jenkins knowledge 
were not disputed, and nothing either party could have discovered would have 
changed the facts, the timing of the events, or Elaine Jenkins knowledge of those 
events. There simply was no showing of any prejudice Elaine Jenkins would have 
suffered had the Alan Jenkins' motion to amend been granted. This is particularly 
true where neither Elaine Jenkins nor the Court identified any additional discovery 
that would be needed to meet the additional affirmative defense. 
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4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS9 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Elaine Jenkins argues that Alan Jenkins failed to adequately brief this issue. 
However, Mr. Jenkins' brief contains excerpts from and references to the testimony 
given at trial related to each requested instruction and explains why the issues 
covered by the proposed instructions were properly before the court and jury. Each 
of the proposed instructions which was not given is included in full, in Addendum 
13 to Mr. Jenkins' brief, with the statutory and/or case law authority shown on each 
page of the proposed instruction^ as evidence that the proposed instruction is 
supported by statute and/or case law. 
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
As requested in Mr. Jenkins' Appellant Brief, he requests that the trial 
court's decision be reversed and judgment awarded to him, declaring him to be the 
owner of the subject property, free and clear of any claims of Elaine Jenkins and 
her children, and that he be awarded damages as prayed in his complaint. In the 
alternative he requests that the case be remanded for a new trial. 
Dated this Y day of August, 2008. 
<T & ?*--
Carl E. Kingston y 
Attorney for Appellant Alan Jenkins 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the V day of August, 2008, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant were sent via U. S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Russell A. Cline, Esq. 
Crippen & Cline, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Carl E. Kingston 
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